Demanding Transparency from the DHS' Disinformation Governance Board
Senators Chuck Grassley and and Josh Hawley ask for answers.
Today, Senator Chuck Grassley (IA) and Senator Josh Hawley (MO) sent the following long-overdue letter to the Department of Homeland Security, asking for information related to its recently-paused Disinformation Governance Board. Responses are expected by June 21, 2022.
June 7, 2022
VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
The Honorable Alejandro N. Mayorkas Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Dear Secretary Mayorkas:
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) information obtained by our offices through protected whistleblower disclosures raises serious concerns about DHS’s recently-paused Disinformation Governance Board (DGB) and the role the DGB was designed to play in DHS counter disinformation efforts. Documents show that, contrary to your May 4, 2022, testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the DGB was established to serve as much more than a simple “working group” to “develop guidelines, standards, [and] guardrails” for protecting civil rights and civil liberties.1 In fact, DHS documents show that the DGB was designed to be the Department’s central hub, clearinghouse and gatekeeper for Administration policy and response to whatever it happened to decide was“disinformation.”
Specifically, documents describe a prominent DGB designed to “serve as the departmental forum for governance of DHS policies, plans, procedures, standards, and activities” pertaining to what the government refers to as “mis-, dis-, and mal- information,” or “MDM,” “that threatens homeland security” as well as the Department’s internal and external point ofcontact for coordination with state and local partners, non-governmental actors, and the private sector.2 Internal DHS memoranda also show that in practice, the DGB was expected to function as a “coordination and deconfliction mechanism... conven[ing] to discuss threats, assessments, response actions, and engagements as often as warranted.”3 According to the DGB’s charter,
1 Resources and Authorities Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 117th Congress (May 4, 2022).
2 DHS Disinformation Governance Board Charter (February 24, 2022); The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), one of nine DHS components with representation on the DGB, defines misinformation as “false, but not created or shared with the intention of causing harm.” CISA defines disinformation as “deliberately created to mislead, harm, or manipulate a person, social group, organization, or country,” and it defines malinformation as “based on fact, but used out of context to mislead, harm, or manipulate.” Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Agency, “MIS, DIS, MALINFORMATION”, available at https://www.cisa.gov/mdm.
3 “Ukraine MDM Playbook Version 12, as of 2/14/2022” at 2. See also DHS Disinformation Governance Board Charter (February 24, 2022).
Secretary Mayorkas June 7, 2022 Page 2 of 5
“DHS-wide or Component specific proposals for funding related to efforts to counter MDM” were also required to be “appropriately coordinated with the Board, including in advance of submitting any final funding proposals.”4
While DHS components apparently have established methods for defining and analyzing disinformation, and would continue to carry out all of their normal operational functions under a DGB, it appears that the DGB was equipped to review evidence presented by representatives of the various components and guide DHS counter disinformation efforts.5 A September 13, 2021, memo prepared in part by Robert Silvers, Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans and, according to whistleblower allegations, one of two intended co-chairs of the DGB, outlined specific policy recommendations that should guide DHS efforts to counter disinformation.6 The memo states that DHS’s “role in responding to disinformation should be limited to areas where there are clear, objective facts.”7 It is unclear how DHS defines “clear, objective facts,” and it is unclear what safeguards, if any, DHS has put in place to ensure that individuals charged with determining which issue areas have “clear” and “objective facts” are not influenced by their own ideological and political beliefs. While the memo boldly asserts that the Department’s “counter- disinformation mission, including the choices as to what issue areas to focus on, must not be politicized and must be protected from perceptions of politicization,” some of the examples of disinformation given in the memo relate not only to foreign disinformation but issues that have been at the heart of domestic political discourse for the past several years.8 For instance, the memo refers to “[c]onspiracy theories about the validity and security of elections” and “[d]isinformation related to the origins and effects of COVID-19 vaccines or the efficacy of masks.”9
Given the significant coordinating role the Department envisioned for the DGB, the consequences of installing Nina Jankowicz, a known trafficker of foreign disinformation and liberal conspiracy theories, as the DGB’s first Executive Director, would have been a disaster. Jankowicz once asserted that the Hunter Biden laptop should be viewed as a “Trump campaign product.”10 Content on the Hunter Biden laptop has since been verified by multiple major news outlets.11 In 2016, Jankowicz also sent out multiple tweets spreading the now-debunked claim
4 “DHS Disinformation Governance Board Charter” (February 24, 2022) at 4.
5 “DHS Disinformation Governance Board Charter” (February 24, 2022); See also “Ukraine MDM Playbook
Version 12, as of 2/14/2022” at 2, 18.
6 “DHS Disinformation Governance Board Charter” (February 24, 2022); Memorandum from Robert Silvers, Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, and Samantha Vinograd, Senior Counselor for National Security, Office of the Secretary, for the Secretary (September 13, 2021).
7 Memorandum from Robert Silvers, Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, and Samantha Vinograd, Senior Counselor for National Security, Office of the Secretary, for the Secretary (September 13, 2021).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Callie Patteson, “Ex-Disinformation Board chief Nina Jankowicz breaks silence, cites death threats” (May 19, 2022), available at https://nypost.com/2022/05/19/ex-disinformation-board-chief-nina-jankowicz-breaks-silence/ . 11 Craig Timberg, Matt Viser, and Tom Hamburger, “Here’s how The Post analyzed Hunter Biden’s laptop,” The Washington Post (March 30, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/30/hunter-
Secretary Mayorkas June 7, 2022 Page 3 of 5
that President Trump had a “secret server” to communicate with Kremlin-linked Alfa Bank.12 In 2020, Jankowicz tweeted that a podcast by Christopher Steele, the author of the debunked Steele Dossier containing Russian disinformation, had provided “some great historical context about the evolution of disinfo.”13 So this begs the question, if the (former) Executive Director of the DGB is incapable of determining what is and is not disinformation, how could the DGB ever have expected to function properly under her leadership? We believe that Congress and the American people require full transparency regarding the DGB’s creation as well as the role Jankowicz would have played had she remained in her position at DHS. Toward that end, we are releasing documents we have collected during our investigation as an attachment to this letter.
Documents also suggest that the Department has been working on plans to “operationalize” its relationships with private social media companies to implement its public policy goals.14 For example, we obtained draft briefing notes prepared for a scheduled April 28, 2022, meeting between Robert Silvers and Twitter executives Nick Pickles, Head of Policy, and Yoel Roth, Head of Site Integrity. The notes are marked “TBC,” and it is unclear whether the scheduled meeting actually took place. The briefing notes frame the planned meeting between Silvers and the Twitter executives as “an opportunity to discuss operationalizing public-private partnerships between DHS and Twitter, as well as [to] inform Twitter executives about DHS work on MDM, including the creation of the Disinformation Governance Board and its analytic exchange...”15 According to whistleblower allegations, Nina Jankowicz may have been hired because of her relationship with executives at Twitter. Consistent with these allegations, Silvers’ briefing notes state that both Pickles and Roth know Jankowicz.16 A recent DHS strategy document further discusses efforts to “[e]mpower partners to mitigate MDM threats.”17 The document states that in certain cases, federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial or nongovernmental partners “may be better positioned to mitigate MDM Threats based on their capabilities and authorities.”18 DHS theorizes that “[b]y sharing information, DHS can empower these partners to mitigate threats such as providing information to technology companies enabling them to remove content at their discretion and consistent with their terms of service.”19
biden-laptop-data-examined/; Katie Benner, Kenneth P Vogel and Michael S. Schmidt, “Hunter Biden Paid Tax Bill, but Broad Federal Investigation Continues,” The New York Times (March 16, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/us/politics/hunter-biden-tax-bill-investigation html.
12 Jankowicz, Nina [@wicsipedia]. “Trump had not one, but two secret email servers to communicate w/ influential Russian bank. Unbelievable.” Twitter (November 1, 2016), available at
Jankowicz, Nina [@wicsipedia]. “Husband texted me ‘you have news to wake up to.’ Never thought it would be this. Confirms our worst fears about Trump. I am horrified.” Twitter (November 1, 2016),
13 Jankowicz, Nina [@wicsipedia]. “Listened to this last night- Chris Steele (yes THAT Chris Steele) provides some great historical context about the evolution of disinfo. Worth a listen” Twitter (August 7, 2020), available at
14 Draft Briefing Notes, Twitter (April 28, 2022).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 “Ukraine MDM Playbook Version 12, as of 2/14/2022” at 17. 18 Id.
19 Id.
Secretary Mayorkas June 7, 2022 Page 4 of 5
Collectively, whistleblower allegations and the documents we’ve reviewed raise concerns that DHS could be seeking an active role in coordinating the censorship of viewpoints that it determines, according to an unknown standard, to be “MDM” by enlisting the help of social media companies and big tech. The DGB’s charter also specifically states that the DGB should “serv[e] as the Department’s internal and external point of contact for coordination with state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, the private sector, and nongovernmental actors regarding MDM.”20
The First Amendment of the Constitution was designed precisely so that the government could not censor opposing viewpoints – even if those viewpoints were false. DHS should not in any way seek to enlist the private sector to curb or silence opposing viewpoints. It is therefore imperative for DHS to provide additional clarity regarding its policies and procedures for identifying and addressing “MDM,” as well as its efforts to “operationalize” public-private partnerships and the steps it is taking to ensure that it does not infringe on the constitutional rights of American citizens.
In order for us to better understand the role of the DGB and DHS’s efforts to counter disinformation, we ask that you respond to the following no later than June 21, 2022.
Has DHS at any point in time asked or suggested to Twitter, Facebook, TikTok, or any other social media executives that they should censor, flag, add context to, or remove any social media posts that it believes to be disinformation?
Has DHS at any point in time asked or suggested to Twitter, Facebook, TikTok, or any other social media executives that they suspend or ban the account(s) of individuals believed to be promoting information it believes to be disinformation?
Please provide all documents, including all written and electronic communications, memoranda, and organizational documents, related to the DGB from the point that DHS first considered establishing a DGB until the present.
Please provide all documents, including all written and electronic communications and memoranda, related to Nina Jankowicz’s selection as Executive Director of the DGB.
Please explain why, in your public statements and testimony before Congress, you have not fully explained the key role that the DGB was designed to play in coordinating among DHS components and engaging the assistance of the private sector.
20 “DHS Disinformation Governance Board Charter” (February 24, 2022) at 3.
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6. Please explain how DHS defines “MDM” and how DHS decides whether a given news story or other piece of information fits its definition of “MDM.” Please identify who exactly is ultimately responsible for making this determination.
7. Please explain the criteria DHS uses when deciding whether to spend taxpayer resources addressing a particular news item or narrative that it has classified as “MDM.”
8. Please describe all safeguards that DHS has put in place to ensure that its efforts to counter the spread of disinformation do not infringe on Americans’ constitutional right to free speech.
9. Did DHS Under Secretary for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans Robert Silvers meet with Twitter executives on April 28, 2022? If so, please provide a summary of topics discussed during the meeting.
10. Please define what DHS means by the phrase, “operationalizing public-private partnerships.”
Thank you for your prompt attention to this important matter. Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley U.S. Senator
Enclosures.
Josh Hawley U.S. Senator
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U.S. Department ofHomeland Security
September 13, 2021
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Robert Silvers Isl
Under Secretary
Office o f Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Samantha Vinograd Isl
Senior Counselor for National Security Office o f the Secretary
Organizing DBS Efforts to Counter Disinformation
The spread of disinformation1 presents serious homeland security risks:
OHS efforts to combat disinfonnation must account for the sensitivities inherent to this mission:
The Department must ensure its counter-disinfonnation efforts do not have the effect o f chilling
orsuppressingfreespeechandfreeassociationorofinfringingonindividuals' privacyorother
First Amendment protected activity.
The protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties must be incorporated into every step of
this work and any overarching framework guiding its execution.
1 The tenn disinfonnation will be used to reference any ofmis-, dis-, ormal-infonnation, orothertenns ofart that refer to false information that is intentionally or inadvertently iajected into the information environment.
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Conspiracy theories about the validity and security o f elections may undennine trust in core democratic institutions, amplify threats against election personnel, and jeopardize the voting rights ofvulnerable communities.
Disinfonnation related to the origins and effects o f COVID-19 vaccines or the efficacy o f masks undercuts public health efforts to combat the pandemic.
Foreign terrorists, nation-states, and domestic violent extremist (DVE) groups leverage disinformation narratives to amplify calls to violence, including racially or ethnically motivated and anti-government/anti-authority violence. These actors often amplify and exploit narratives that already exist in public discourse, such as disinfonnation surrounding the validity o f the 2020 election underpinning calls to violence on January 6, 2021. ·
Disinfonnation can complicate the perfonnance ofcore DHS missions. Falsehoods surrounding U.S. Government immigration policy drive vulnerable populations to pay smugglers to bring themonthedangerousjourneytooursouthernborder. Disinformationcanhamperemergency responders in the aftennath ofnatural disasters or other incident responses.
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Washington, DC 20528
Homeland Security
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The counter-disinfonnation mission, including the choices as to what issue areas to focus on, must not be politicized and must be protected from perceptions ofpoliticization.
OHS should not attempt to be an all-purpose arbiter o f truth in the public arena. It should instead focus its efforts on disinformation impacting DHS core missions.
DHS's role in responding to disinfonnation should be limited to areas where there are clear, objective facts (i.e., medical evidence regarding COVID; factual information about elections administration and security, DVE narratives) and where OHS has particular expertise and a strong oversight structure to ensure legal and policy review o f any response efforts.
DHS has a unique role to play in infonnation sharing across the government, with SLTT entities, and with the public. DHS is uniquely situated to share informatiori in an authoritative way, somethingthattheprivatesectorandacademiacannotdo. Conversely,infonnationsharing carries risks for the Department and must be accomplished in a way that is perceived as unbiased and viewpoint neutral.
In addition, the federal government may not always be the ideal or most trusted voice on a given topic. OHS should work closely as appropriate with state, locaJ, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) authorities and private sector partners.
DBS Functions and Existing Efforts to Counter Disinformation
OHS components are already engaged in countering disinfonnation, with activities falling into five functions that are performed by the components themselves or through third-party resources: 1) identification ofdisinfonnation relevant to DHS's mission; 2) analysis ofits source and influence; 3) information sharing regarding threats posed by disinformation, 4 ) response to the disinformation threat; and 5) building resilience to disinformation. There is also excellent work being done by interagency partners, the private sector, and academia-particularly concerning identifying and analyzing disinformation-and OHS should leverage this work when possible.
1) Identification: Information gathering on disinfonnation threats and trends.
•
•
!&A's Homeland Influence Task Force collects information on possible disinformation from publicly available sources as well as other intelligence sources where the collection furthers one ofl&A'sauthorizedinteUigencemissions,suchasforeign intelligenceandprotectionofcriticaJ infrastructure.
CISA gathered information on disinformation related to the elections with SLTT partners leading up to the 2020 election and has limited authority to collect infonnation on disinfonnation related to critical infrastructure.
2) Analysis: Assessing the impact of specific disinformation narratives on the homeland or on DHS missions.
• l&A, as well as other components engaging in intelligence and analytic functions, produce analysis on disinformation threats, whom they may be targeting, and what attendant risks might arise.
3) Information Sharing: Providing timely, quality information on disinformation threats and strategic trends to stakeholders including SLTT authorities, private sector partners, or the public directly.
• Leading up to the 2020 election, CISA relayed reports ofelection disinfonnation from election
officials to sociaJ media platform operators.
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I&A distributes intelligence products to SLTT partners related to disinformation threats. Most recently, I&A issued a Public Safety Notification concerning the possible threat o f violence motivated by conspiracy theories related to the "reinstatement" offormer President Trump.
The August 13, 2021 National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin referenced the threat of disinformation spread by foreign and domestic threat actors.
4) Response: Factually countering disinfonnation through public communications channels to mitigate related threats, increase awareness, and improve public safety.
During the 2020 election, CISA maintained a ' Rumor Control' website to counter foreign
disinformation related to the security and conduct ofthe vote. CISA sought to 'prebunk'
incorrect claims with factual information.
In your August 12, 2021 public remarks in Brownsville, TX concerning the southwest border,
you stated your intention to "debunk false information that has been spread," sharing factual information about the situation on the ground and DHS's border enforcement and policies.
5) Building Resilience: Improving the public's ability to detect disinformation through digital and media literacy, where DHS has a unique role to play, programs and civic education. These programs are coordinated with federal, SLTT, and private sector partners.
CISA lau6ched a graphic novel series to reach potentially impacted communities in a non-
traditional way. The novels educate on the dangers o f disinformation and how to detect it.
PLCY is workjng with the Department ofEducation to build resilience to disinformation and CP3 Digital Forums and Community Awareness Briefings could further address digital media literacy,
empowering communities to mitigate the harmful effects ofcontent encouraging violence.
S&T Technology Centers are examining methods to mitigate disinfonnation, to include
leveraging global research leaders on this topic and to provide scientific advice in support of Department initiatives.
Models to Structure DBS Counter-Disinformation Efforts TherearemanypossiblewaystostructureDHScounter-disinformationeffortsmovingforward. The models presented below for your consideration represent a spectrum o f options, from fully federating counter-disinformation operations to operational components, to building in vacying levels of Headquarters oversight, governance, and coordination.
Option 1 Fully Federated Model: Operational Components Execute Independently
The DHS counter-disinformation mission would be entirely federated to components, which would report to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in the ordinary course but would not otherwise be governed byspecificheadquarterspoliciesorguidanceonthistopicbeyondexistingDHSoversightfunctions. This model generally resembles the status quo in which components identify and prioritize disinformation threats in their respective mission spaces (sometimes relying on I&A intelligence reports), plan and execute operations, and conduct their own oversight and governance. It also means that each component operates under its own authorities, including the limits on these authorities.Option 2 Governance Board Model: Independent Component Execution Under an Overarching DHS Protective Framework
Execution ofDHS counter-disinformation operations would be federated to components, but subject to overarching Department-wide governance requirements to ensure that a common set of issue-agnostic safeguards and oversight tools are employed. PLCY could convene a governance board that wouldPRE-DECISJ ONAL/DE LIBERATIVE WtU!ILA881Flti8 ;';' FQll QFFIQlhL WBe Ql flsY
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promulgate policy and legal requirements setting forth baseline requirements that all components must meet in their counter-disinfonnation work, to include protections ensuring compliance with applicable civil rights and civil liberties, privacy, and legal requirements, such as First Amendment and Privacy Act requirements. Members would include all components conducting counter-disinformation operations as well as CRCL, PRJV, OGC, l&A, S&T, and MGMT.
The board's role would not be prescriptive, instead providing components with guidelines and minimum safeguardsapplicableacrossdisinformationmissions,regardlessofthetopic. Theboardcouldalso develop and share with components best practices, to include:
Risk assessment methodologies to prioritize disinformation threats with a nexus to violence or that pose a direct risk to operations;
Guidelines for partnering with or procuring counter-disinformation services from the private sector consistent with the sensitivities addressed above; and
Best practices for auditing or other oversight o f counter-disinfonnation operations.
The board could also convene DHS stakeholders when new disinformation threats emerge or are identified by interagency partners that do not clearly fit within a disinformation mission already being performed by a DHS component The board would determine who within the Department is best positioned to address the threat, make recommendations to the Secretary as to how the new threat should be addressed, and support whichever operational component is taking on the mission in standing up with appropriate governance.
Theboardwouldnotplayaroleincoordinatingoroverseeingoperations. Componentswoulddetermine the functions they need for their counter-disinformation missions and how they will perform them. For example, a component could conduct identification and analysis itself, or leverage reporting from l&A or another federal agency, or engage private sector services.
Components would also be responsible for partner engagement in their respective mission spaces, including with the interagency, SLTT authorities, private sector entities, tech platforms, and the general public. Components would work together as needed to coordinate engagement with partners to avoid organizations receiving overlapping outreach from multiple parts of the Department.
Option 3 Disinformation Coordinator Model: Coordinated Oversight and Operations
The most centralized approach could involve a newly-designated Coordinator for Countering Disinformation, modeled after the Department's Counterterrorism Coordinator. The Coordinator would work with components (and potentially non-DHS agencies should the administration encourage such an approach) to develop policies, procedures, and guidelines, and identify required resources to mature the Department's disinformation capabilities. Components would still be responsible for executing their respective disinformation missions, but the Coordinator would regularly convene components to facilitate the identification and analysis of disinfonnation threats and coordinate operational responses.The Coordinator would also be responsible for developing homeland security counter-disinformation functions in coordination with components, other federal agencies, international partners, academia, non- profits, and the private sector, to include:
• Instituting Department-wide governance and oversight structures to ensure counter- disinformation efforts satisfy, among other considerations, civil rights and civil liberties, privacy, and legal (including First Amendment) requirements (similar to Option 2 above);
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Growing DHS counter-disinfonnation capacity by ensuring components develop expertise through new hiring, training, and external partner engagement;
Keeping apprised of the overall disinfonnation environment and coordinating action with relevant agencies and stakeholders on cross-cutting issues.
Reviewing and making recommendations with respect to DHS authorities to counter disinfonnation;
Developing policies for DHS public communications on disinformation as well as driving engagement with SLTT and private sector entities, including platfonn operators, together with components;
Engaging SL1 T authorities to respond to the disinformation threat, including through Fusion Centers and state homeland security advisors; and
Serving as a central point ofcontact for interagency partners such as the White House, State's Global Engagement Center, DOJ, HHS, DOD, and the Intelligence Community.
*****
PLCY recommends Option 2, to ensure nimbleness and component ownership o f their mission spaces, while also providing assurance that all programs across the Department will operate in a manner consistentwithourvalues. Allcomponentsrecommendafulsomediscussionwithyoutocharttheway forward in this challenging space, so that a detailed action and implementation plan can be developed based on your guidance.
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FROM:
• SUBJECT:'
Robert Silvers
Under Secretary
Office o f Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Jennifer Daskal
Acting Principal Deputy General Counsel
ROBERTP SIL VERS
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ROBERTP SILVERS Date: 2022.02.01 16:27:36 -05'00'
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January 31, 2022 ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
Disinformation Governance Board Charter
Purpose: ToobtainyourapprovalofthecharterfortheDisinformationGovernanceBoard.
Background: OnSeptember29,202I,youdirectedheadquartersandComponentleadershipto pursue a governance board model to coordinate efforts to counter mis-, dis-, and mat-information (MDM) across the Department.1 You emphasized the need for clarity as to the Department•s policies,standards,andbestpracticesrelatedtoMDMwork. Youalsoconcludedthatoperational efforts to counter MDM should largely be carried out by Components, which would be responsible for their respective mission areas subject to the oversight o f the governance board.
Based on that guidance, we developed the attached charter for a DHS Disinformation Governance Board (''the Board") to execute this critical work. The Board will ensure Departmental efforts to counter MDM are coordinated, deconflicted, and harmonized. The Board's primary roles are to develop and support the implementation o f best practices, policies, and protocols that support the identification, assessment, response, and resilience to MDM threats, and that do so in a way that ensures respect for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. The Board will also support and coordinate, in conjunction with the relevant Components, MOM workwithotherdepartmentsandagencies,theprivatesector,andnon-governmentalactors. In addition, the Board will support research and development efforts to understand the MOM threat to homeland security.
The Board will be co-chaired by representatives ofthe Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY)andtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel. Memberswillincludecomponentsengagedin
1 This model is presented as Option 2 in the September 13, 2021 memorandum 'Organizing OHS Efforts to Counter Disinfonnation.'
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JENNIFER C ~~~:~~~KAI. DASKAL Dale: 2022.02.01
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Subject: DisinformationGovernanceBoardCharter Page2
counter-MOMactivitiesorthatprovideoversightandsupportforsuchactivities. Memberswill. be represented by the principal or deputy for their respective Component/Offices.
The Board will meet no less than once per quarter for the first two years of its existence. It will besupportedbyaSteeringGroup,consistingofrepresentativesdesignatedbyeachMember. A senior official from within PLCY will serve as Executive Director for the Board and Chair o f the Steering Group, to be supported by an Executive Secretariat comprised ofstaffdetailed or assigned to PLCY. As we build, we may enlist your office's support in obtaining detailees or other staffing.
The Charter has been coordinated with all OHS components that will be Members ofthe Board.
For your awareness, we attach a copy o f the MOM Playbook that PLCY , together with components, developed for countering MOM in a unified way across the Department in the context ofthe current situation in Ukraine. We are enthusiastic about the further work that the Disinfonnation Governance Board can accomplish.
Timeliness: We request your signature ofthe charter as soon as practicable.
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Modify/date_ _ _ __ _ __ _
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Subject: Disinformation Governance Board Charter Page3
Recommendation: Approve the charter for the Disinformation Governance Board.
Attachments:
A. Disinformation Governance Board Charter
Ukraine MDM Playbook
'Organizing OHS Efforts to Counter Disinformation' (September 13, 2021)
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DHS Disinformation Governance Board Charter
Section 1. Purpose
The DHS Disinformation Governance Board ("Board") will guide and support the Department's efforts to address mis-, dis-, and mal-information that threatens homeland secmity ("MDM"). Whereas Department Components will lead on operational responses to MDM i n their relevant mission spaces, the Board will ensure DHS efforts are coordinated, deconflicted, and harmonized, both within DHS and across the interagency, to ensure efficiency, unity o f effort, and promotion ofapplicable compliance and best practices.
The Board will focus on the following four cross-functional lines o f effort to counter MDM, many ofwhich are already underway ("lines ofeffort',): (1) identifying MDM ("Identification"); (2) assessing and analyzing the risk that such MDM poses to homeland security ("Risk Assessment''); (3) responding to these MOM threats ("Response"); and (4) building resilience to MDM (''Building Resilience").
With respect to each ofthese lines ofeffort, the Board will develop and support the implementation o f governance policies and protocols that, among other issues, protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties; hannonize and support coordination with other departments and agencies, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations; and support research and development efforts to assess and combat MDM.
Section2. Members
The Board will be co-chaired by representatives of the Office for Strategy, Policy, and Plans(PLCY)andtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel(OGC). StandingBoardmemberswillbe representatives ofthe following DHS Components: the Management Directorate (MGMT); Office o f Intelligence and Analysis (l&A); Science and Technology Directorate (S&T); Privacy Office (PRIV); Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL); Office ofPublic Affairs (OPA); Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA); Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). RepresentativesshallbethePrincipalorDeputyfortheirrespectiveComponent Other Components may be invited to either join the Board or participate on an a d hoc basis, as appropriate and needed.
Section 3. Structure
The Board will be supported by a Steering Group, which will consist o f a representative from each Component participating in the Board. Each representative will be selected by their respective Board member.
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The Board co-chairs will designate a OHS senior official to serve as the Executive Director for theBoardandChairoftheSteeringGroup. TheExecutiveDirectorwillbedetailedorassigned to PLCY, where they will be supported by an Executive Secretariat for the Board comprising staffdetailedorassignedtoPLCY. TheExecutiveDirectorwillattendandmayparticipateinall Board meetings.
Section4. BoardResponsibilities
Components will lead on MOM-related operational responses and other efforts to counter MOM intheirrelevantmissionspaces. TheBoardwillserveasthecentralforumintheDepartmentto ensure consistent governance and coordination o f such efforts, and adherence to applicable constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities and obligations.
The Board's initial responsibilities will include a review ofexisting MOM governance policies and practices across the Department, including:
policies, procedures, practices, plans, and standards to ensure compliance with applicable constitutional, statutory, and regulatory obligations;
policies, procedures, practices, plans, and standards to ensure appropriate privacy and civil rights and civil liberties protections;
policies, procedures, practices, plans, and standards for interactions with the private, non- profit, and academic sectors; and,
relevant procurement policies and practices.
Based, in part, on the findings from its initial review, the Board will be responsible fordeveloping MOM-related guidance, best practices, and recommendations regarding:
compliance with applicable constitutional, statutory, and regulatory obligations;
standards for and implementation ofappropriate privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties
protections; .
procurement guidelines for contracting or funding third parties to support the
Department's MDM efforts;
grant funding and cooperative agreements;
development and implementation o f new technological and data management tools; and,
any other applicable guidance, best practices, and recommendations to guide the
aforementioned four lines ofeffort.
The Board also will coordinate, deconflict, and harmonize departmental efforts to address MOM,including by:
receiving regular and routine updates :from DHS Components, the Intelligence Community, and other interagency partners on MDM;
hannonizing and deconflicting activities by OHS Components regarding the lines of effort;
harmonizing, deconflicting, and coordinating, in conjunction with relevant Components, the Department's external engagement regarding MDM;
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o serving as the Department's internal and external point o f contact for coordination with state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, the private sector, and non-governmental actors regarding MDM; and,
• serving as the Department's internal and external point o f contact for receiving, coordinating, responding to, and interacting with interagency partners, including the Executive Office o f the President, for policy matters generally related to mis-, dis-, and mal-information, but not related to the performance o f intelligence activities.
Section 5. Roles and Responsibilities ofBoard Members
The co-chairs ofthe Board will:
► convene the Board as needed;
► approve the agenda for Board meetings;
► preside over Board meetings;
► approve summaries o f conclusions reached during the Board meetings;
► communicate Board decisions and activities to the Secretary and other DHS leadership,
as appropriate;
► represent the Board to external audiences; and,
► take all other actions necessary and proper for the execution o f the Board's
responsibilities.
►
The Board Members will:
► represent the perspectives oftheir respective Components at Board meetings;
► review any proposals submitted to the Board; and,
► ensure that their respective Components implement, execute, and follow Board decisions.
The Executive Director will:
► propose agenda items and discussion topics for the Board following Steering Group review;
► communicate the positions taken at the Steering Group concerning proposals before the Board;
► propose summaries o f conclusion for each Board and Steering Group meeting;
► implement and execute Board decisions through the Steering Group;
► supervise the activities ofthe Executive Secretariat; and,
► represent the Steering Group and, where appropriate and in coordination with the co-
chairs, the Department to external audiences on MDM-related matters. The Steering Group Members will:
► represent the perspectives oftheir respective Components at Steering Group meetings;
► review and discuss any proposals to be submitted to the Board;
► communicate their considerations ofBoard proposals to their respective Board Members,
the Executive Director, and other members ofthe Steering Group;
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► reviewandapprovesummariesofconclusionsofSteeringGroupmeetings;and,
► subject to the direction and guidance oftheir respective Board Members, help ensure that
their respective Components implement, execute, and follow Board decisions. Section 6. Processes & Procedures
The Board will meet regularly at the discretion of the co-chairs and no less than once per quarter for the first two years o f the Board's existence. The Steering Group will meet at the discretion o f the Board or Executive Director. Issues raised and proposals submitted to the Board will be resolvedbyconsensustothegreatestextentpossible. Wherethereisadisagreementamongstthe Boardmembers,theBoardwillresolvethematterbeforeitbymajorityvote. Intheabsenceof consensus, any Board member may elevate, in the fonn o f a written memorandum, an issue to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary where they believe that a decision made by the Board implicates their statutory or other assigned authorities.
The Steering Group is not a voting body. Instead, its members will discuss all issues brought beforeitandmaketheirrecommendationstotheBoard. SteeringGroupmemberswillsupport the development o f consensus recommendations to the Board to the greatest extent possible.
Section7. RelationshiptoOtherDepartmentalGovernanceBodies
The Board wi11 serve as the departmental forum for governance o f DHS policies, plans, procedures,standards,andactivitiespertainingtoMDMthatthreatenshomelandsecurity. As such, all DHS-wide or Component-specific proposals for funding related to efforts to counter MOM should be appropriately coordinated with the Board, including in advance o f submitting any final funding proposals. Matters raised before the Board may implicate other departmental governanceforaalreadyinexistence. Wherethatoccurs,theBoardwillcoordinateitsactivities with those respective fora through the Executive Director.
Section8. EffectiveDate
This charter will go into effect when signed by the Secretary ofHomeland Security. Section 9. Signature
dro N. Mayorkas Secretary
U.S. Department o f Homeland Security
•
POI\ OMOl;l1bUH OtILY Twitter
April 28, 2022 (TBC)
Overview:
You wiJI meet in person with Twitter executives Nick Pickles, Head ofPolicy, and Yoel Roth, Head ofSite Integrity, for XX minutes on public-private partnerships, MDM, and countering DVE. The meeting is offthe record and closed press.
►
►
►
You have previously met with Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Twitter's Vice President of Public Policy and Philanthropy for the Americas.
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Key Objectives:
• This meeting is an opportunity to discuss operationalizing public-private partnerships
between DHS and Twitter, as well as inform Twitter executives about OHS work on MOM, Including the creation ofthe Disinformation Governance Board and its analytic exchange, and the Department's ongoing DVE work.
Note:NickandYoe)bothknowDGBExecutiveD1rectorNmaJankow1c2.
Propose that Twitter become involved in Disinformation Governance Board Analytic
Exchanges on Domestic Violent Extemism (DVE) and Irregular Migration.
► Thank Twitter for its continued participation in the CISA Analytic Exchange
on Election Security.
• AskwhattypesofdataorinformationwouldbeusefulforTwittertoreceiveinAnalytic
Exchanges or other ways the Department could be helpful to Twitter's counter-MDM efforts.
Participants:
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Managing Director for Strategy
(Principal), (Role) (Staffer), (Role) (Staffer), (Role)
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• 2:30pmET: Event concludes.
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•
►
►
The Board will ensure that OHS is actively and efficiently leveraging all its available resources and capabilities to mitigate and counter disinformation with ahomeland security nexus, consistent with a deep commitment to protecting privacy and free speech.
The Board will serve as a coordinating mechanism for the Department's outreach to industry, civil society, and international partners on MOM.
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Introduce the Disinfonnation Governance Board.
Discussion Points: OHS Efforts on MOM
• The Board's initial work plan includes establishing analytic exchanges with industry on countering MOM related to domestic violent extremism and irregular migration.
► Propose that Twitter be an active participant in these exchanges and thank the company for their continued engagement with CISA'selection security exchange.
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DVE
The United States remains deeply concerned regarding the complex, cross-cutting li.nks between MDM and all forms ofviolent extremism.
The primary terrorism-related threat to the United States continues to stem from Ione offendersorsmallcellsofindividualswho~ motivatedbyarangeofforeignand/or domestic grievances often cultivated through the consumption ofcertain online content.
Key factors contributing to the current heightened threat environment include:
► The proliferation of false or misleading narratives, which sow discord or
undermine public trust in U.S. government institutions.
► Continued calls for violence directed at U.S. critical infrastructure; soft targeL~ and
mass gatherings; faith-based institutions, such as churches, synagogues, and mosques; institutions ofhigher education; racial and religious minorities; government facilities and personnel, including law enforcement and the military; the media; and perceived ideological opponents.
► Calls by foreign terrorist organizations for attacks on the United States based on recent events.
In June, the White House released the first ever National Strategyfor Combatting Domeslic Terrorism. In response, DHS has realigned and dedicated resources to combat domestic violent extremists (DVEs) and would like to have a deeperdiscussion on our latest assessments.
► The OHS Office oflntelligence and Analysis (or I&A) created a domestic terrorism branch within its counterterrorism mission center to ensure DHS develops the expertise necessary to produce sound and timely intelligence, at the lowest classificationpossibleinorderto infonn ourstakeholders.
► The Department established a new Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) to improve the Department's ability to combat terrorism and targeted
3
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violence, consistent with privacy protections, civil rights and civil liberties, and
other applicable laws.
• We are working to improve our ability to identify narratives that are playing out online in
effort to counter the threat that is increasingly manifesting through various digital forums
Ukraine
Together with partners from across the U.S. Government, DHS components - including
CISA, FEMA, TSA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and our policy and legal staffs are preparing for a range ofpotential scenarios.
Ourgoalistoensurethat- wellinadvanceofanypotential incident-weare connecting operators from across our government and the private and civil sectors so we can identify and work to remediate an emerging campaign as quickly as possible.
Twitter participated in a CISA/FBI led call with social media companies on February 25th to discuss potential o f influence operations stemming from the escalating geopolitical issues as it relates to U.S. critical infrastructure.
Following actions taken by the U.S. and allies, we have seen increased instances ofMDM and malign foreign influence on publicly available websites that may be linked to the Russian government, military, and intelligence services in the Russian and Ukrainian languages. These include allegations that the United States is deploying military forces to Ukraine's eastern front and that U.S. intelligence services are staging false-flag attacks in Ukraine to instigate a conflict
Hard Q&A:
• What questions do we expect and/or know will come up in this meeting?
. ► Please provide a concise recommended response. Attachments
A. Biographies
StaffResponsibleforBriefingMemo: NinaJankouicz,ExecutiveDirectorDRS Disinformation Governance Board,
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DHS Disinformation Governance Board Charter
Section1. Purpose. ThepurposeoftheBoardistosupporttheDepartment'seffortstoaddressmis-, dis-, and mal-information (MOM) that threatens homeland security. Departmental components will leadonoperationalresponsestoMOMintheirrelevantmissionspaces. TheBoardwillensuretheseactivities are conducted within a protective governance framework that respects privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. This work will be speaker-agnostic, focusing on the narratives rather than those who originate or spread them. The board will also ensure that Departmental efforts are coordinated and deconflicted to ensure efficiency, unity o f effort, and promotion o f best practices across the Department's MOM work.
More specifically, the Board's primary roles are three-fold: I) To develop and implement governance policies for departmental efforts related to MOM, 2) To decontlict departmental efforts to counter MOM narratives that threaten homeland security, including with respect to departmental engagement with third parties; and 3) To streamline and enhance coordination with other departments and agencies and promote best practices for counter-MOM work.
These efforts will focus on four lines o f effort (LOEs) that cut across efforts to counter MOM across OHS's many mission spaces:(!) identifying narratives ofconcern (''Identification"); (2) assessing and analyzing the risk that such narratives pose to homeland security ("Risk Assessment"); (3) responding to these narratives ("Response"); and (4) developing resilience against MOM ("Building Resilience").
Sec.2. Members. TheBoardwillbeco-chairedbytheOfficeforStrategy,Policy,andPlans(PLCY) andtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel(OGC). StandingBoardmemberswillbethefollowing:the Management Directorate; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A); the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T); the Privacy Office (PRIV); the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL); the Office ofPublic Affairs (OPA); the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA); the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Other components may be invited to participate on an ad hoc basis.
Sec.3. Structure.
EachBoardmemberwillberepresentedbythePrincipalorDeputyfortheirrespectivecomponent. The Board will be supported by a OHS MOM Steering Group, which will consist ofrepresentatives for each componentparticipatingintheBoardselectedbytheirrespectiveBoardmember. Inaddition,the Secretary will designate a senior official from within the Department to serve as the Executive Agent for theBoardandChairoftheSteeringGroup. TheExecutiveAgentwillbedetailedorassignedtoPLCY, where they will be supported by an Executive Secretariat for the Board and Steering Group comprising staff detailed or assigned to PLCY. The Executive Agent will attend and may participate in all Board meetings.
Sec. 4. Roles & Responsibilities.
DepartmentcomponentswillleadonoperationalresponsestoMOMintheirrelevantmissionspace. The Board will serve as the central forum in the Department to ensure consistent governance and coordination o f such efforts.
► The Board's initial responsibilities wiJI include a review ofexisting MOM governance policies and practices across the Department, including-
o Policies, procedures, practices, plans, and standards to ensure compliance with applicable constitutional, statutory, and regulatory obligations;
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o Policies, procedures, practices, plans, and standards to ensure appropriate privacy and civil rights and civil liberties protections;
o Policies, procedures, practices, plans, and standards for interactions with the private, non- profit, and academic sectors; and
o Relevant procurement policies and practices.
► The Board will also be responsible for developing guidance, best practices, and recommendations
with respect t o -
o Compliance with applicable constitutional, statutory, and regulatory obligations;
o Ensuring the implementation of appropriate privacy and civil rights and civil liberties
protections;
o Proposals for additional or amended departmental authorities or funding, consistent with
the processes ofthe Deputies Management Action Group (DMAG);
o Procurement guidelines for contracting with third parties to support the Department's
MDM efforts;
o Grant funding; and
o Any other applicable best practices to guide the lines of effort with respect to
identification, risk assessmen,, response, and building resilience.
The Board also will coordinate and deconflict departmental efforts to address MDM narratives that
threatenhomelandsecurity. Thiswillinclude-
► Receiving regular and routine updates from Departmental components on MDM narratives of concern and the relevant MDM lines ofeffort;
► Deconflicting any ac~ivities by the Department and relevant components to counter MDM with respect to external outreach to the private and other nongovernmental actors;
► Servingasadepartmentalpointofcontact,inadditiontocomponentpointsofcontact,as appropriate, for receiving and assessing concerns about MDM raised by federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, or other nongovernmental partners; and
► Servingasadepartmentalpointofcontact,inadditiontocomponentpointsofcontact,for receiving, coordinating, responding to, and interacting with interagency partners, including the Executive Office ofthe President, for all MDM matters not related to the performance of intelligence activities.
The Co-Chairs ofthe Board w ill-
► ConvenetheBo~;
► Compose the agenda for Board meetings;
► Preside over Board meetings;
► Approve and disseminate summaries ofconclusions reached at the Board meetings;
► Communicate Board decisions and activities as they deem appropriate to the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary;
► Represent the Board to external audiences; and
► TakeallotheractionsnecessaryandpropertoexecutionoftheBoard'sresponsibilities.
The Board members will-
► Represent the perspectives of their respective offices or components at Board meetings;
► Review and either approve or reject any proposals submitted to the Board; and
► Ensure that their respective components implement, execute, and follow Board decisions.
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The Executive Agent w ill-
► Propose agenda items and discussion topics for the Board following Steering Group review;
► Communicate the position(s) taken at the Steering Group concerning proposals before the Board;
► ProposesummariesofconclusionforeachBoardmeeting;
► Implement and execute Board decisions through the Steering Group;
► Supervise the activities ofthe Executive Secretariat; and
► Represent the Steering Group and, where appropriate and in coordination with the Co-Chairs, the
Department to external audiences on matters concerning MOM. The Steering Group members w ill-
► Represent the perspectives of their respective offices or components at Steering Group meetings;
► Review and either endorse or oppose any proposals to be submitted to the Board;
► Communicate their endorsements or oppositions to Board proposals to their respective Board
members, the Executive Agent, and other members o f the Steering Group; and
► Subject to the direction and guidance oftheir respective Board members, help to ensure that their
respective components implement, execute, and follow Board decisions. Sec. 5. Processes & Procedures.
The Board will meet regularly and at the discretion of the Co-Chairs, but in any event no less than once per quarter for the first two years ofthe Board's existence. The Steering Group will meet at the discretion of the Executive Agent. Issues raised and proposals submitted to the Board will be resolved by consensus tothegreatestextentpossible. WherethereisadisagreementamongsttheBoardmembers,theBoard willresolvethematterbeforeitbymajorityvote. Intheabsenceofconsensus,anyBoardmembermay elevate, in a form ofa written memorandum, an issue to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary where they believe that a decision made by the Board implicates their statutory or other assigned responsibilities.
TheSteeringGroupisnotavotingbody. Instead,itsmemberswillmakerecommendationstotheBoard, ascommunicatedbytheExecutiveAgent. TheSteeringGroupmemberswillendeavortomake consensusrecommendationstotheBoardtothegreatestextentpossible. TheExecutiveAgentwill preparedraftsummariesofconclusionaftereachBoaf4meeting. TheCo-Chairswillreviewandapprove the summaries of conclusion before they are socialized with the other Board members.
Sec.6. RelationshiptoOtherDepartmentalGovernanceBodies.
The Board will serve as the senior departmental forum for governance of departmental policies, plans, procedures, standards, and activities pertaining to MOM. As such, all proposals for funding through the DMAG concerning efforts to counterMOM must be coordinated in advance with the Board. Mattersraisedbeforetheboardmayimplicateotherdepartmentalgovernanceforaalreadyinexistence. Where that occurs, the Board will coordinate its activities with those respective fora through the Executive Agent.
Sec.7. EffectiveDate.
The charter will go into effect when signed by the Secretary ofHomeland Security.
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ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Robert Silvers
Under Secretary
Office ofStrategy, Policy, and Plans
Jonathan Meyer General Counsel
DBS Disinformation Governance Board Charter
Purpose: To obtain your approval ofthe charter for the OHS Disinformation Governance Board.
Background: InaSeptember29,2021discussionwithheadquartersandComponentleadership, you directed the Department to pursue a governance board model to coordinate efforts to counter mis-, dis-, and mal-information (MDM). 1 Y ou discussed the benefits o f having a mechanism that would develop and coordinate intra-Departmental governance policies, standards, and best practices related to MOM work and that could coordinate efforts to engage private sector stakeholders. Execution ofOHS counter-MOM activities would be federated to Components, who would be responsible for their respective mission areas subject to the oversight ofthe governance board.
Based on your guidance, we have developed the attached charter for a DHS Disinformation GovernanceBoard(Board)toexecutethiscriticalwork. TheBoard'sprimaryroleswouldbe three-fold: 1)Todevelopandimplementgovernancepoliciesfordepartmentaleffortsrelatedto MOM; 2) To deconflict, where necessary, departmental efforts to counter MOM narratives that threaten homeland security, including with respect to departmental outreach engagement with third parties; and 3) To streamline and.enhance coordination with other departments and agencies and promote best practices for counter-MOM work.
The Board will be co-chaired by the Office ofStrategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY) and the Office oftheGeneralCounsel. MemberswillincludeallComponentsandheadquartersofficesengaged incounter-MOMactivitiesorprovidingoversightandsupportforsuchactivities. TheBoard's guidance will include protections that ensure compliance with applicable law and policy and
1 This model is presented as Option 2 in the September 13, 2021 memorandum 'Organizing DHS Efforts to Counter Disinformation.'
U.S. Department ofHomeland Security Wasblogtoo, DC 20528
~ Homelalld ~ Security
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Subject: DBSDisinformationGovernanceBoardCharter Pagel
protectindividuals'privacy,civilrights,andcivilliberties. Memberswillberepresentedbythe principal or deputy for their respective Component/Offices.
TheBoardwillmeetnolessthanonceperquarterforthefirsttwoyearsofitsexistence. Itwill be supported by a Steering Group, consisting ofrepresentatives designated by each member.
Y ou will designate a senior official from within the Department to serve as Executive Agent for the Board and Chair of the Steering Group, who would be supported by an Executive Secretariat comprising staffdetailed or assigned to PLCY.
Chartering the Board would provide structure and oversight to critical efforts already underway, including: 1)areviewofexistingpoliciesandpracticestoprotectprivacy,civilrights,andcivil liberties; 2) developing a framework for the Department to notify specific entities, or in some cases the public, ofMDM relevant to homeland security; and 3) reviewing opportunities for deeper information sharing and exchange ofbest practices with platform operators and other private sector partners.
Timeliness: MDMconstitutesasignificantandimmediatethreattohomelandsecurity. We requestyoursignatureofthecharterbyJanuary31 to allowforthefirstmeetingoftheBoardto occur by the end ofFebruary.
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Modify/date_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Subject: DBS Disinformation Governance Board Charter Page3
Recommendation: ApprovethecharterfortheDHSDisinformationGovernanceBoard.
Approve/date_________ Disapprove/date_________ _
Needs discussion/date- - - - - - - - - A. DisinformationGovernanceBoardCharter
Attaclnnents:
B. 'Organizing OHS Efforts to Counter Disinformation' (September 13, 2021)
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· JOSH HAWLEY MISSOURI
116 RossnL SENATI, OtACE BUIUMNG TEUPHONE:1202122~54
FAX: (2021228-0526
W W W . H A W L E Y. S l i N A 1 1 a . G O V
tinitnl ~tatr.s ~rnatr
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2509
April28,2022
COl,UlllTEl:S
JUDIC1ARY
ARMED SERVICES
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SMALL BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas Secretary ofHomeland Security
U.S. Department o f Homeland Security 245 Murray Lane, S.W.
Washington D.C. 20528
Dear Secretary Mayorkas:
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I write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security's decision to create a new Disinformation Governance Board. I confess, I at frrst thought this announcement was satire. Surely no American Administration would ever use the power of Government to sit in judgment on the First Amendment speech of its own citizens. Sadly, I was mistaken. Rather than protecting our border or the American homeland, you have chosen to make policing Americans' speech your priority. This new board is almost certainly unconstitutional and should be dissolved immediately.
For well over a year, your Department bas consistently treated competing policy views as disinformation to be monitored or investigated. However, political debates on issues such as immigration, pandemic lockdowns, and foreign policy clearly constitute "core political speech" protected by the First Amendment.• The Supreme Court has even gope so far as to say that "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea."2 The apparent broad mandate of this new government entity to "coordinate countering misinformation" in America undermines the argument that it can even exist consistent with the Constitution.3
Particularly troubling is your choice to lead the new board, Nina Jankowicz, a supposed "expert" with a long history of partisan attacks. Consider:
In 2020, she described PresidentTrump's use ofthe national guard as "a sentence I expect to hear from leaders of authoritarian countries, not the President of the United States."4
In 2021, she quoted with praise an article that said "homegrown fascism predated President Donald Trump."5
She has said America is systemically racist.6
In response to revelations about Hunter Biden's laptop, she tweeted that "50 former natsec officials
and 5 former CIA heads that believe the laptop is a Russian influence op. Trump says 'Russia, Russia, Russia.",..,
1 Meyer v. Grant,486 U.S. 414,422 (1988).
2 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,418 U.S. 323,339 (1974).
3 https://www.po]jtico.com/newsletters/playbook/2022/04/27/fauci-puUs-out-of-whcd-js-biden-next-00028l31 4 https://twitter.com/wiczipedia/status(l267589264440729600
5
l 23630403694593
6 https://twjtter.com/wiczjpedia/status/131 1t23042387529734
7
board?
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Jankowicz has said the new DHS Board will "maintain the Dept's committment [sic] to protecting free speech.''8 This is particularly ironic given Jankowicz's extensive criticism of free speech and the First Amendment. Jankowicz bas claimed that "the 'free speech vs censorship' framing is a false dichotomy."9 And when Elon Musk announced his acquisition of Twitter, she said "I shudder to think about if free speech absolutists were taking over more platforms, what that would look like for the marginalized communities ... which are already shouldering ... disproportionate amounts of this abuse."10 Jankowicz has even described opponents of social media speech codes as ''first amendment zealots."11 These statements that question the value of free speech are obviously disqualifying for such a role.
While Democrats have for years controlled the public square through their Big Tech allies, Mr. Musk's acquisition of Twitter bas shown just how tenuous that control is. It can only be assumed that the sole purpose of this new Disinformation Governance Board win be to marshal the power of the federal government to censor conservative and dissenting speech. This is dangerous and un-American. The board should be immediately dissolved.
So that Congress can consider remedial legislation, please provide the following responses prior to your expected testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on May 4,2022:
How will this Disinfoi:ination Board function? And who exactly will it be monitoring?
What analysis did OHS conduct, if any, to ensure that the Disinformation Board and its activities
comport with the First Amendment?
Why did DHS time its announcement of this governance board directly after Mr. Musk's
acquisition of Twitter?
Who appointed Ms. Jankowicz to head the board as executive director? Were you aware of her
history of partisan conduc~ prior to her appointment?
Has OHS conferred with any private social media company in the creation or operation of this
Sincerely,
Josh Hawley
United States Senator
8
I0721
11
10 htfl)s://www.npr.org/2022/04/J6/J0932I2502/women-face-disproportionate-attacks-online-one-expert-shares-some-of-the- details
11 https://twjtter,com/wiczipedia/status/11928972523287l4240
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Department of Homeland Security Response to Senator Hawley's April 27, 2022 Letter
1. How will this Disinformation Board function? And who exactly will it be monitoring?
For nearly 10 years, different agencies across DHS have worked to address disinformation that threatens our homeland security. The Department is deeply committed to doing all ofits work in a way that protects Americans' freedom of speech, civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy. In fact, the Disinformation Governance Board is an internal working group that was established with the explicit goal ofensuring these protections are appropriately incorporated across DHS's disinformation-related work and that rigorous safeguards ofAmericans' fundamental rights are inplace. TheworkinggroupalsoseekstocoordinatetheDepartment'sengagementsonthis subjectwithotherfederalagenciesandadiverserangeofexternalstakeholders. Theworking group does not have any operational authority or capability.
The Department is focused on disinformation that threatens the security ofthe American people, including disinformation spread by foreign states such as Russia, China, and Iran, or other adversaries such as transnational criminal organizations and human smuggling organizations. Such malicious actors often spread disinformation to exploit vulnerable individuals and the American public, including during national emergencies.
DHS would be failing in its mission ifit ignored disinformation that poses a threat to the homeland. To that end, Components seek to address disinformation related to their authorized missions. Some examples ofthat are as follows:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) counters disinformation that cartels and human smugglers spread to migrants to persuade them to cross our southwest border illegally. CBP's work includes its "Say No to the Coyote" campaign, making clear that entering the United States illegally is a crime.
In 2012, during Hurricane Sandy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) corrected false information about the safety ofdrinking water and the location ofshelters toprotectandservethehurricane'svictims. FEMAhassincebuiltcapacitytoidentify and respond to false information during major disaster responses, including Hurricanes Maria and Ida, during which FEMA provided critical information to protect disaster survivors from targeted scams. FEMA also ensures that disinformation campaigns do not prevent Americans from accessing federal aid during and after disasters.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works with private sector stakeholders to mitigate the risk ofdisinformation to U.S. critical infrastructure, work that has continued in light ofRussia's invasion ofUkraine.
The working group is co-chaired by the DHs· Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans and Office of the General Counsel, and includes other DHS leaders from CISA, FEMA, CBP, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Office ofIntelligence and Analysis, Science and Technology Directorate, and Privacy Office.
2. What analysis did DBS conduct, if any, to ensure that the Disinformation Board and its activities comport with the First Amendment?
The Department is deeply committed to doing all ofits work in a way that protects Americans' freedom ofspeech, civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy. In fact, the Disinformation
Release Authorized by Senator Grassley and Senator Hawley
Department of Homeland Security Response to Senator Hawley's April 27, 2022 Letter
Governance Board is an internal working group that was established with the explicit goal of ensuring these protections are appropriately incorporated across DHS's disinformation-related work and that rigorous safeguards ofAmericans' fundamental rights are in place.
It is co-chaired by the DRS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans and the Office of the General Counsel, and its membership includes departmental leaders from other DRS components, including those from the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office ofPrivacy. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer were consulted prior to the establishment ofthe Board and through the development and publication ofits charter.
Secretary Mayorkas will request that the bipartisan Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) make recommendations for how the Department can most effectively and appropriately address disinformation that poses a threat to the homeland, while protecting free speech and other fundamental rights, and that HSAC Co-Chair Jamie Gorelick and HSAC Member Michael Chertofflead this effort. Ms. Gorelick is a former U.S. Deputy Attorney General and Mr. Chertoffwas Secretary ofHomeland Security during President George W. Bush's Administration. At Secretary Mayorkas's request, DRS is exploring additional ways to enhance the public's trust in this important work.
3. Why did DHS time its announcement of this governance board directly after Mr. Musk's acquisition of Twitter?
The timing ofthe announcement was not related to any such external events. The Board's Charter was signed in February 2022.
4. Who appointed Ms. Jankowicz to head the board as executive director? Were you aware of her history of partisan conduct prior to her appointment?
Nina Jankowicz was chosen for her eminent qualifications and leadership in the field ofonline disinformationandmalignforeigninfluence. Sheisawidelyacknowledgedexpertononline disinformation who has testified multiple times before Congress as well as the UK and European Parliaments. From2016-2017,undertheauspicesoftheFulbrightprogram,Ms.Jankowicz servedasanadvisertotheUkrainianForeignMinistry. SheworkedcloselywithourUkrainian allies to combat Russian disinformation meant to destabilize the Ukraini~ government and jeopardize its international partnerships. Most recently, she was a Disinformation Fellow at the non-partisan Wilson Center.
5. Has DHS conferred with any private social media company in the creation or operation of this board?
TheBoardisaninternalworkinggroupthatdoesnothaveoperationalcapacity. Thecreationof the Board was not discussed with any external entities prior to the public announcement.
117THCONGRESS 2D SESSION
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H.R.
To direct the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ofthe Department ofHomeland Security to identify, track, and share with homeland security stakeholders and the public information regarding misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation with national or homeland security implications, and for oth~r purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Ms. CLARKE o f New Y ork introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
ABILL
To direct the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ofthe Department of Homeland Security to identify, track, and share with homeland security stakeholders and the public information regarding misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation with national or homeland security implications, and for other purposes.
BeitenactedbytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesofthe UnitedStates o fAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Strengthening Resilience Against Disinformation Act of2022".
(Original Signature ofMember)
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SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS OF MDM IN THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002.
Section 2201 ofthe Homeland Security of2002 (6 U.S.C. 652) is amended-
(!) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as paragraphs (7), (8), and (9), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraphs:
"(4) DISINFORMA TION.-The term 'disinformation' means false information that is deliberately created to mislead, harm, or manipulate a person, social group, organization, or country.
"(5) MALINFORMA TION.-The term 'malinformation' means information that is based on fact, but used out ofcontext to mislead, harm, or manipulate.
"(6) MISINFORMA TION.-The term 'misinformation' means information that is false, but not created or shared with the intention of causing harm.".
SEC. 3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CISA DIRECTOR RELATING TO MISINFORMATION, DISINFORMATION, AND MALINFORMATION.
( a ) IN G E N E R A L . - S u b s e c t i o n ( c ) o f s e c t i o n 2 2 0 2 o f t h e H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y Act of2002 (6 U.S.C. 652) is amended-
(!) in paragraph (13), by striking "and" after the semicolon;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (14) as paragraph (15); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (13) the following new paragraph:
"(14) carry out activities to identify, track, and share with homeland security stakeholders and the public information regarding misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, including by carrying out sections 2209(c)(13) and 2220D; and".
(b) NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION CENTER.
Subsection (c) ofsection 2209 of the Homeland Security Act of2002 (6 U.S.C. 659) is amended-
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(1) in subparagraph (11 ), by striking "and" after the semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (12), by striking the period at the end and inserting "· and"· and
''
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(13) maintaining capabilities to identify, track, and share with homeland security stakeholders and the public information regarding misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation that, either individually or in the aggregate, is likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests b f the United States, including undermining public confidence in democratic institutions or election integrity, or to homeland security, economic security, civil liberties, public health, emergency response, or public safety, or any combination thereof, for the purpose of enhancing the collective response to such misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, including strengthening national security and promoting_ strong media literacy and digital resilience, including by carrying out activities in section 2220D.".
SEC. 4. RUMOR CONTROL PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY TO COUNTER MISINFORMATION, DISINFORMATION, AND MALINFORMATION.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Subtitle A of title XXII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
"SEC. 2220D. RUMOR CONTROL PROGRAM TO COUNTER MISINFORMATION, DISINFORMATION, AND MALINFORMATION.
"(a) ESTABLISHMENT.-There is within the center authorized pursuant to section 2209 a public-facing website, known as 'Rumor Control', to carry out sections 2202(c)(l4) and 2209(c)(13).
"(b) FuNcnoNs.-In administering the Rumor Control website, the Director shall establish partnerships with relevant public and private sector stakeholders, including the following:
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"(1) Technology companies that own or operate internet-enabled communications platforms commonly used to spread misinformation, disinformation, or malinformation.
"(2) Non-governmental and civil-society groups, including civil rights and civil liberties organizations, with relevant subject matter expertise or stakeholder relationships, to identify and respond to misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, and ensure such response is designed to effectively reach and raise awareness among communities or demographics targeted by such content.
"(3) State, Local, Tribal, and territorial governmental agencies.
"(4) Relevant Federal agencies, including Sector Risk Management Agencies, as appropriate.
"(c) INFORMATIONPROTECTIONS.-Ifin the course of carrying out this section personally identifiable information is received by the Agency, the Director shall ensure such information is protected from unauthorized use or disclosure in a manner consistent with the protection ofpersonal information under the Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Act of2015 (enacted as tit:le I ofdivision N of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Public Law 114--113)).".
(b) CLERICALAMENDMENT.-The table of contents in section l(b) ofthe Homeland Security Act of2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2220C the following new item:
"Sec. 2220D. Rumor control program to counter misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.". SEC. 5. REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date ofthe enactment ofthis Act, and not later than 60 days after each regularly-scheduled general election for Federal office, the Director ofthe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ofthe Department ofHomeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security ofthe House ofRepresentatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs ofthe Senate a report describing actions taken by the Director in furtherance of sections 2202(c)(l4), 2209(c)(l3), and 2220D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended and added by this Act, including specific details regarding the Agency's activities pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section 2220D, for the four-year period preceding each such election.
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So has this Jankowicz person registered as a foreign agent? As she evidently has allegience to Ukraine before the United States…
This is largely peripheral, IMO.
This is the kind of manufactured "new" controversy that burns valuable energy that should be spent exposing the truth of the exp. injections, the corruption of the FDA/CDC/Fauci, the Gain of Function bioweapon production, the coverup of adverse events in the military, the roots of the virus, the forbidding of treatments that would have saved lives...
This is largely what I pointed out after Joe Rogan had his balls removed after Malone by Spotify et. al.
Many came to shout about "free speech" which is huge, sure.
But it diverted from the real stuff that can't be investigated b/c it leads to our Security State.